Introduction:
Statutory interpretation concerns
the role of judges when trying to apply an Act of Parliament to an actual case.
The wording of the Act may seem to be clear when it is drafted and checked by
Parliament, but it may become problematic in the future.
Statutory
interpretation is the process of interpreting and applying Legislation .
For example, that a statute mandates that all vehicles must be registered with the department of motor vehicles. If the statute does not define vehicles, then it will have to be interpreted if questions arise. A person driving a motorcycle might be pulled over and the police may try to fine him if his motorcycle is not registered with the DMV. If that individual argued to the court that a motorcycle is not a "vehicle," then the court would have to interpret the statute to determine what the legislature meant by vehicle and whether the motorcycle fell within that definition and was covered by the statute.
For example, that a statute mandates that all vehicles must be registered with the department of motor vehicles. If the statute does not define vehicles, then it will have to be interpreted if questions arise. A person driving a motorcycle might be pulled over and the police may try to fine him if his motorcycle is not registered with the DMV. If that individual argued to the court that a motorcycle is not a "vehicle," then the court would have to interpret the statute to determine what the legislature meant by vehicle and whether the motorcycle fell within that definition and was covered by the statute.
There are numerous rules
of statutory interpretation.
The first rule and most important rule is the rule dealing with the statute's
plain language. This rule essentially states that the statute means what it
says. If, for example, the statute says "vehicles," then the court is
going to assume it means vehicles and not "planes" or something else.
When is statutory interpretation used?
Practitioners,
academics and students alike, encounter difficulties when interpreting
legislation. Complications may be caused by the lexical or syntactical
selections of the draftsman. In addition, legislation may appear to be too
narrow and insufficient, or too broad and general. Nevertheless, language
issues are a common problem that statutory interpretation seeks to combat. It
may be the case that statutory interpretation requires a judge to infer or
elaborate on imprecise or incomplete legislation. Although legislators will try
and account for every eventuality, the court will inevitably be called upon to give
guidance. It is important to bear in mind that judges should act as administers
of justice, and not creators of law. This remains to be a contested topic in
the context of statutory interpretation.
Confusion may
be caused by legislation which is poorly or incorrectly drafted (see The Dangerous Dogs Act 1991).
The court will therefore be required to read around this, and consider the
intentions of Parliament when the statute was drafted. This was the case in
Adler v George (1994), where the imprecise drafting of the Official Secrets Act 1920
made it an offence to obstruct HM Forces ‘in the vicinity of’ an army base. The
court interpreted the wording of the statute to mean, ‘in or near the
prohibited place’, thereby imposing liability on the defendants.
There are three
basic rules (sometimes referred to as canons) that the courts will employ to
determine the intention of Parliament, and the meaning of a statute.
Statutory Tools
Explanatory Notes:
Legislators have sought to overcome the potential problems associated with statutory interpretation, by drafting statutes that include explanatory notes. This is a relatively new concept, introduced by Parliament in 1999 to originally assist in the interpretation of bills. The significance of explanatory notes as helpful tools to help in the process of statutory interpretation was highlighted in the decision in R (Westminster City Council) v National Asylum Support Service (2002). Lord Steyn mooted that, ‘the Explanatory Notes cast light on the objective setting or contextual scene of the statute… such materials are therefore always admissible as aids to construction’.
Statutes may
also include sections dedicated to the interpretation of particular provisions.
These sections may be presented in the form of definitions or examples. As an
illustration, the Theft Act 1968 offers a definition for the term ‘theft’, in
addition to a section that defines ‘property’.
The Title and Headings of a Statute:
A broad title may also aid the process of statutory interpretation. It was stated by Lord Simon in the Black-Clawson Case (1975) that, irrespective of the information contained within a statute, the ‘plainest of all the guides to the general objectives of a statute’ is the title. In a similar manner, a heading will often introduce, and clearly state the subject matter for a particular provision or chapter.
The Preamble and Side Notes:
It is often the
case that a statute has been drafted using ellipsis, whereby its content is
sometimes difficult to interpret. A court therefore may refer to the preamble
for further guidance when interpreting the statute, as it will be written in
prose.
Although a
court will not concentrate on the content of a side note, it will however be
used to shed light on a provision, which is ambiguous or imprecise. It is
evident that the process of statutory interpretation enables a reader to
utilise all areas of a statute.
Punctuation and Grammar:
Punctuation is
an essential feature that may affect the way in which a statute is read. The
case of Sir Roger Casement (1917) required the statutory interpretation of the
Treason Act 1351. The statute purported that, ‘If a man be adherent to the
king's enemies in his realm giving to them aid and comfort in the realm or
elsewhere’, he would be found guilty of treason. Casement argued that he
carried out his acts ‘elsewhere’ and not within the realm. This argument failed
as the Court found that the use of a comma meant that an individual was liable
for treason for acts committed ‘in the realm, or elsewhere’. Casement was
therefore liable under the Act and given the death penalty.
External Sources used in Statutory Interpretation:
If the
information within a statute is insufficient or imprecise, a court may refer to
external sources. A judge may consider the overall history of a legal area to
determine how more recent legislation should be interpreted (see Redrow Homes v
Bett Brothers (1998)). This is an inherent feature of the common law, as a
judge will utilise previous decisions that draw on statute(s) which are
relevant to his case. There may also be other statutes that are in pari
material. This could be a statute, which primarily concerns a different legal
area, but offers some assistance with a particular element of the case facts.
The
Interpretation Act 1978 helps make sense of grammatical issues, and language
interpretation for statutes and acts of Parliament. For instance, if an act
uses the word ‘may’, this will be considered permissive. On the other hand,
where an act uses ‘shall’, this will be interpreted as imperative. Definitions
for common provisions such as ‘land’, are also included to help with statutory
interpretation.
International
Conventions will be acknowledged and adhered to when statutory interpretation
takes place. In the case of Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd (1980), the court
referred to the original Warsaw Convention for further interpretative help.
It is not
uncommon for the courts to draw on the view of academic experts. This may be
the case for example, where academics fabricate scenarios of how the law should
be applied – where the statute itself fails to provide an example. Although
this may not be binding, it may be used to bolster an argument (R v Shipuri
(1987)). Where a statute omits a definition or explanation of how a key term
should be interpreted, a dictionary may be used to give a general insight.
Law Commission Reports and White Papers:
The
comprehensive studies conducted by the Law Commission are often useful sources
of information in statutory interpretation. The Black Clawson Case (1975) made
it permissible for judges to refer to these reports to expose issues which may
not be considered in legislation. Further clarification concerning the use of
Law Commission reports in statutory interpretation was provided in Davis v Johnson (1978).
The Court said, ‘the report may be used to identify the mischief the
legislation is intended to remedy but not to construe the enacting words’.
Government White Papers are sometimes included, particular if the law in that
particular area is subject to review or change.
Hansard:
This is the
official Parliamentary Report which details the discussions when the Act in its
development stages. Since 1992, Hansard has been a feature in court dialogue,
and often provides more general and broader considerations that may have not
been included in the Act. In Pepper v Hart (1993), the House of Lords held that
judges would be allowed to use Hansard in statutory interpretation. However,
Parliamentary discussions may also confuse matters due to the general nature of
the discussions.
European Union Law and the Purposive Approach:
European Union
law has had a resounding impact on statutory interpretation. English courts are
required to interpret Community law with regard to the explicit wording and intention.
This approach stems from the case of Marleasing v LA Commercial (1992),
establishing the Marleasing Principles. However, the Court of Appeal clarified
the position with statutory interpretation stating:
‘The
interpretation of legislation under…the Marleasing principle may involve a
substantial departure from the language used though it will not involve a
departure from the fundamental or cardinal features of the legislation. It is
possible to read the legislation up (expansively) or down (restrictively) or to
read words into the legislation’.
However, in the
case of Webb v EMO Air Cargo (1993), the House of Lords held that the statutory
interpretation of European legislation must be carried out ‘without distorting
the meaning of domestic legislation’.
Many European
countries adopt a purposive approach to statutory interpretation. This approach
enables the courts to skirt around a language issue and employ what they
consider is the purpose of the statute. It is becoming increasingly more common
for the UK
courts to move towards this, particular where statutory interpretation of
European Union legislation takes place. However, the English courts are wary of
the purposive approach, exercising caution so that the statutory interpretation
does not distort the meaning of a statute. As stated by Lord Denning ‘We sit
here to find out the intention of Parliament and carry it out by filling in the
gaps rather than by destructive analysis’.
The European Convention of Human Rights:
The full extent
of the European Convention of Human Rights is yet to be realised where
statutory interpretation is concerned. Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998
provides that, ‘so far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and
subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is
compatible with the Convention rights’.
There has been
much debate over the significance of this provision on statutory
interpretation. Although the courts have a duty to read this provision in a
manner that is compatible with the Act, there are very few examples of its
application.
Presumptions:
The court will
also rely on presumptions in the process of statutory interpretation. For
example, there is a presumption that mens rea is a fundamental requirement of
guilt in criminal law. There is also a presumption that punishment will not be
administered in the absence of fault. Another example is that legislation
cannot be applied retrospectively. There are certain exemptions to this rule
e.g. Human Rights Act 1998 s 22(4) and the Terrorism Act s 40. Therefore, these
presumptions are rebuttable, often where legislation provides definitions
illustrating this.
Final Thought:
In
consideration of this overview, statutory
interpretation is an extremely dynamic and demanding process.
When reading a statute, it is worth putting yourself in the shoes of a
Parliamentary draftsman to understand the real intention and effect of their
work. It is inevitable that mistakes will be made and clarity will be sought.
These factors make statutory interpretation an essential skill of judgment.
Conditions for statutory interpretation:
Firstly a court will give the
everyday meaning to the words, notwithstanding that it may lead to an
absurdity. The golden rule may be used where the literal rule leads to an
obvious absurdity, and lastly the mischief rule may be applied to ascertain the
purpose for which the legislation was enacted, by going beyond the actual words
used in the legislation. Courts are in a most difficult position in this regard
as they do not pass the legislation which they are required to interpret and
the court will strive for a sensible meaning to the statute where at all
possible.
A court may refer to the content
of the legislation in interpreting legislation, including the title of the legislation,
its preamble and its schedules. Also, the Minister's speech in the passage of
the Bill (recorded in Hansard) may be referred to as with dictionaries and
textbooks.
The following presumptions apply
when interpreting statute:
Ø
They are presumed not to bind the Constitution;
Ø
They do not operate retrospectively in respect
to substantive law (as opposed to procedural law) ;
Ø
They do not interfere with legal rights already
vested;
Ø
They do not oust the jurisdiction of the courts;
Ø
They do not detract from constitutional law or
international law.
These are presumptions that may
be rebutted by clear words.
Statutes imposing taxation or
penal in nature are subject to strict construction, and ambiguity is resolved
in favour of the subject.
A number of rules of statutory
rules of interpretation appear below.
Usage: The process
of statutory interpretation may include the application of the common law rules
of construction noscitur a sociis, ejusdem generis and expressio unis exclusio
alterius.
Rules of Statutory Interpretation:
Parliament
passes statutes and judges must interpret and apply them in court. Where
the meanings of words are unclear, judges will apply one of the various rules
of interpretation. These rules were developed in the following way:
ü
The Literal Rule;
ü
Golden Rule;
ü
Use of Golden Rule;
ü
Differences between the Literal Rule and Golden
Rule;
ü
Mischief Rule;
ü
Use of Mischief
Rule;
ü
Criticism of Mischief
Rule;
ü
The Purposive Approach;
ü
The Purposive Approach in Europe;
ü
The Similarity between the Mischief Rule and
Purposive Approach;
ü
Strict & Equitable interpretation;
ü
Restrictive & Extensive interpretation;
ü
Historical interpretation;
ü
Sociological interpretation;
ü
Miscellaneous interpretation;
ü
Plain Meaning Rule;
ü
Soft Plain
Meaning Rule;
ü
Reasons favored of Soft Plain Meaning Rule;
ü Criticism
of Soft Plain Meaning Rule;
ü Rule
of Ejusdem generis;
ü
Noscitur
a sociis (known from associates)
ü Rule
of expression unius est exclusio alterius;
(the
express mention of one thing is the exclusion of another)
The Literal Rule
The first rule
of statutory interpretation is
the literal rule. A court will initially assess the common and everyday
understanding of a provision. Therefore, a provision will be construed plainly,
as it would be from a dictionary definition. One of the founding cases for
statutory interpretation in view of the literal rule is the Sussex Peerage Case
(1884). It was purported by Tindal CJ that where legislation is contested
because of ambiguity, it:
…Should be
construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If
the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no
more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary
sense…
The literal rule is a seemingly straightforward process. Yet in
practice, it may result in an unforgiving outcome. For example, where the Fatal
Accidents Act 1864 granted compensation for railway workers who were killed
‘relaying’ or ‘repairing’ tracks, an individual who was carrying out
‘maintenance’ would not be compensated (as per the decision in London and North
Eastern Railway Co v Berriman (1946)).
Lord Esher in R v Judge of the City of London Court (1892)
said: “If the words of an Act are clear then you must follow them even though
they lead to a manifest absurdity. The court has nothing to do with the
question whether the legislature has committed an absurdity.” Case
examples of the literal rule include:
Whiteley v Chappell (1868). The
defendant pretended to be someone who had recently died in order to use that
person’s vote. It was an offence to “personate any person entitled to
vote”. As dead people cannot vote, the defendant was held not to have
committed an offence.
London & North Eastern Railway v Berriman
(1946). The claimant’s husband was killed while oiling points along a
railway line. Compensation was only payable if he had been “relaying or
repairing” the line. The House of Lords held oiling points was
maintaining the line and not “relaying or repairing”.
The Golden Rule
If statutory interpretation
should bring about a repugnant or absurd outcome, the golden rule will seek to
apply a reasonable and rational result. It is permissible for a court to modify
or vary the language of the statute ‘so as to avoid such inconvenience’ (Becke
v Smith (1836)).
There have been
a number of occasions where statutory interpretation may have resulted in a
perverse outcome, but for the redeeming affect of the golden rule. One
particular case of illustration is Re Sigsworth (1953). Here, the literal interpretation
of a statute would have benefited the perpetrator, who murdered his mother and
was set to inherit her estate. However, the Court adopted a more lenient view
of statutory interpretation in the interest of public policy, preventing the
son from enjoying the benefits of his mother’s death.
A further
feature of statutory interpretation’s golden rule empowers a judge to employ a
meaning that he considers to be appropriate. This may be the case where a word
could be understood in a number of contexts. The case of R v Allen (1872) is a
good example. The Offences against the Person Act 1861 provided that ‘whoever
being married shall marry any other person during the life of the former
husband or wife…shall be guilty of bigamy’. It was held that an individual who
is already married would not be able to ‘marry’ another, yet they may be able
to go through a marriage ceremony. Consequently, the Court held that under the
golden rule of statutory interpretation, the phrase ‘shall marry’, will mean an
individual ‘who goes through a marriage ceremony’.
The golden rule
provides that if the words used are ambiguous the court should adopt an
interpretation which avoids an absurd result. For example:
Adler v George (1964). It was an
offence to obstruct HM Forces “in the vicinity of ” a prohibited place.
The defendants had obstructed HM Forces in a prohibited place (an army base)
and argued that they were not liable. The court found them guilty as “in
the vicinity of” meant near or in the place.
In its second,
broader sense, the court may modify the reading of words in order to avoid a
repugnant situation as in:
Re Sigsworth (1935). The defendant
had murdered his mother. She did not have a will and he stood to inherit
her estate as next of kin, by being her “issue”. The court applied the
golden rule and held that “issue” would not be entitled to inherit where they
had killed the deceased.
The
golden rule is an adaption of the Plain Meaning Rule . It
provides that wordings should be given their ordinary meaning as far as
possible, but only to the extent that they do not produce an absurd or totally
obnoxious result.
:"… the grammatical and ordinary sense of
the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity or
inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical
and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity
or inconsistency, but not farther." - Lord Wensleydale in ''Grey v.
Pearson'' (1857; 6 HL CAS 61)
Use of Golden
Rule: This rule may be used in two ways. It is applied most
frequently in a narrow sense where there is some ambiguity or absurdity in the
words themselves. For example, imagine you see a sign saying "Do not use Lifts in case of fire." If you interpret
this sign literally, you will never use the lifts just in case there is a fire.
The second use
of the golden rule is in a wider sense, to avoid a result that is obnoxious to
principles of public policy, even where words have only one meaning. In ''Rex
v. Sigsworth'' (1935; Ch 89) the court decided that a son who had murdered his
mother could not inherit her estate under s.46 of the Administration of Estates
Act (1925), even though there was only one literal interpretation of the word
"issue" used in s.46.
Differences between the Literal Rule and Golden Rule:
Differences between the Literal Rule and Golden Rule:
The most common rule of statute
interpretation is the literal rule, derived from the Sussex Peerage Case
(1844). According to this rule, the words in a statute must be given their
plain, ordinary and literal meaning.
However, the literal rule
sometimes causes absurdities; such as in Whiteley v. Chappell (1868),
where a defendant was found not guilty of impersonating “any person entitled to
vote” because they had impersonated a dead person.
As a result of these problems,
the courts developed the golden rule; which was first expressed in the case of Grey
v. Pearson (1857). The golden rule states that “the grammatical and
ordinary sense of words may be modified so as to avoid [an] absurdity or
inconsistency, but no farther.”
The golden rule has two forms:
wide and narrow. The wide rule, as demonstrated by the decision in Re Sigsworth
[1935] that a son who murdered his mother could not inherit her estate,
allows an obnoxious result to be avoided even where the wording of a statute
has only one true meaning.
The narrow rule is much more
restrictive however, and is only used where there is ambiguity or absurdity in
the law itself. For example, in R v. Allen (1872) the Act outlawing
bigamy gave rise to impossibility. The court therefore interpreted the bigamy
legislation so as to imply commission if a person underwent the marriage
ceremony while already married, rather than having to be married twice at the
same time; an impossibility due to the wording of the marriage law.
The Mischief Rule
The mischief
rule is contained in Heydon's Case
(1584), and allows the court to look at the state of the former law in order to
discover the mischief in it which the present statute was designed to
remedy. For example:
Smith v Hughes (1960). Six women
had been charged with soliciting “in a street or public place for the purpose
of prostitution”. However, one woman had been on a balcony and others
behind the windows of ground floor rooms. The court held they were guilty
because the mischief aimed at was people being molested or solicited by
prostitutes.
Corkery v Carpenter (1951). A
person could be arrested if found drunk in charge of a “carriage” on the
highway. The defendant had been arrested for being drunk in charge of a
bicycle on the highway. The court held that a bicycle was a “carriage”
for the purposes of the Act because the mischief aimed at was drunken persons
on the highway in charge of some form of transport, and so the defendant was
properly arrested.
In another
view, The Mischief Rule is a certain rule that judges can apply in statutory
interpretation in order to discover Parliaments intention. It essentially asks
the question:By creating an Act of Parliament what was the "mischief"
that the previous law did not cover? The application of this rule gives the
judge more discretion than the literal and the golden rule as it allows him to
effectively decide on Parliament's intent. It can be argued that this
undermines Parliaments supremecy and is undemocratic as it takes law making decisions
away from the legislature.
This was set
out in Heydons Case {Link without Title}
3 CO REP 7a where it was stated that there were four points to be taken into
consideration when interpreting a statute:
Ø
What was the common law before making the act?
Ø
What was the "mischief and defect" for
which the common law did not provide?
Ø
What remedy the parliament hath resolved and
appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth?
Ø
What is the true reason of the remedy?
Use of Mischief
Rule: This Rule Of Construction is of
narrower application than the Golden Rule or the Plain Meaning rule, in that
it can only be used to interpret a statute and, strictly speaking, only when
the statute was passed to remedy a defect in the common law.
Legislative intent is determined by examining
secondary sources, such as committee reports, treatises, law review articles
and corresponding statutes.
This rule has
often been used to resolve ambiguities in cases in which the literal rule
cannot be applied. In Smith v Hughes {Link without Title}
ALL ER 161 the mischief approach gave a more sensible outcome than that of the
literal approach.
The Street Offences Act 1959
referred to prostitutes soliciting in a street, but in this case the
prostitutes were soliciting through a window in a house, the judges took it to
be included in the Act as the “Mischief” was the inconvenience to the passers
by.
Criticism: One could argue, however, that every statute is passed for a reason, and therefore the rule could be applied to any statute.
Criticism: One could argue, however, that every statute is passed for a reason, and therefore the rule could be applied to any statute.
The Purposive Approach
This rule goes further than the
mischief rule in that it not only allows judges to look at the defect that the
statute in question is trying to remedy, but also it allows judges to decide
what they believe parliament wanted to achieve. (It creates more scope for
undemocratic law making).
The purposive
approach is one that will “promote the general legislative purpose underlying
the provisions” (per Lord Denning MR in Notham
v London Borough of Barnet
(1978). For example:
Royal College of Nursing
v DHSS (1980). The court had to decide if nurses
could lawfully continue an abortion started by a “registered medical
practitioner” (a doctor). Although Lord Diplock referred to the mischief
of illegal abortions, Lord Keith referred to the purpose of the Abortion Act 1967,
which was to ensure that socially acceptable abortions were carried out in safe
conditions. The House of Lords held that the procedure was lawful.
Jones v Tower Boot Co Ltd (1997).
The complainant suffered racial abuse at work, which he claimed amounted to
racial discrimination for which the employers were liable under s32 of the Race
Relations Act 1976. The CA applied the purposive approach and held that
the acts of discrimination were committed “in the course of employment”.
Any other interpretation ran counter to the whole legislative scheme and
underlying policy of s32.
The Purposive Approach in Europe:
Under the European Communities Act 1972 ,
a court must adopt a purposive approach in construing legislation that
implements European Community (EC)
law.
European
Community legislation is drafted in a very different way from statutes of some
member countries. It follows the Civil Law tradition, which
favours simplicity of drafting and a high degree of abstraction, rather than
the exhaustive approach adopted in some common law member countriels like the United Kingdom.
This means that a purposive approach is vital when interpreting legislation,
and questions of wide economic or social aims are often considered by the
courts.
In ''Litster v. Forth Dry Dock and Engineering
Co. Ltd'' (1989; 1 ALL ER 1134), employees were dismissed one hour before a
business was transferred to a new owner. The employees claimed they were
unfairly dismissed. Regulation 5 of the ''Transfer of Undertakings (Protection
of Employment) Regulations 1981'' (SI 1981 No. 1794) (a Statutory Instrument that
implemented a European Community Directive), provided that the House Of Lords read in the
additional words "or would have been so employed if he had not been
unfairly dismissed before the transfer" as a reason connected with the
transfer. This was necessary to achieve the purpose of the EC Directive, which
was to protect the employees on the transfer of a business.
Although this
could not have been achieved using the Rule Of Construction known
as the Plain Meaning rule or
literal rule, a similar result could have been achieved using the Mischief Rule or, probably,
the Golden Rule , i.e., one
hour could still have been interpreted as "immediately" before the
transfer.
The purposive approach is also a feature of
the reasoning of the European Court of Justice .
Because decisions of this court are binding in member countries, its rules of
legal reasoning are of increasing importance in member countries' legal systems
and have an indirect influence on interpretation, even when the legislation
does not originate from the European Community.
The Similarity between the Mischief
Rule and Purposive Approach:
The oldest rule of statutory
interpretation is the mischief rule, also known as the rule in Heydon's Case
(1584). According to this rule, the court examines what the state of the law
was before the legislation was passed, in order to determine what problem, or
“mischief”, it was supposed to prevent.
It does this by asking four
questions:
Ø
Was the law before the statute was enacted?
Ø
What was the mischief or defect not remedied by
existing law?
Ø
What remedy did Parliament propose?
Ø
What is the true reason for the remedy?
As the rule interprets statutes
addressing defects in the common law, the mischief rule is now of limited use.
In its place is the purposive approach; adopted from European Court of Justice
via the European Communities Act. Here, the courts try to determine the purpose
behind a statute, and then interpret the wording in light of this. It is,
essentially, the mischief rule for modern legislation.
The Strict & Equitable interpretation
When the ‘litera
legis’ suffers from ambiguity, it usually happens that one of the meanings is
more obvious & consonant with the popular use of the language. If this
meaning is adopted, the interpretation is called strict or literal. Sometimes
courts reject the natural & most known interpretation in favor of another
which conforms better to the intention of the legislature through it may not fit
in with the ordinary use of language. When that is done, there is equitable
interpretation. The court must interpret the purpose of the law with justice
& equity.
The Restrictive & Extensive interpretation
The rule of
restrictive interpretation is applied to penal & fiscal statutes. These
laws imposed restraints on the liberty of an individual or the enjoyment of
property by him. In such cases, courts are against a construction which imposes
a greater burden on the subject than is warranted by the literal meaning of the
language employed in the statute.
Extensive interpretation: For giving
facility to the plaintiff, if the
court passes his limitation & interprets a large number of words exclusive
out of the cases, then it is called extensive interpretation.
The Workmen Compensation
Act, 1906. Section: 1: ‘When a workman dies by an accident arising out of the
course of his employment, his widow may claim damages from the employers.’
The Historical interpretation
It is a process
while interpreting a statute when its language gives no clue to the intention
of the legislature. What is done is that court considers the circumstances
attending the original enactment & give effect to the intention.
In Heydon’s case, it considered four
grounds below it:-
Ø
What was common law before the making of the
Act?
Ø
What was the mischief & defect for which the
common law did not provide?
Ø
What remedy the parliament hath resolved &
appointed to cure the diseases of the commonwealth.
Ø
The true reason of the remedy.
Here common law is also considered.
As for example,
when there is a conflict about the caretaker govt. then the court discuss the
matter & decide that in what circumstances the was selected. Then the court
interprets the caretaker govt. Act.
The Sociological interpretation
The jurists of
the sociological school are prepared to give a lot of freedom to the judges
while interpreting a statute.
The view of the
Kohler is that for the determination of the correct interpretation,
Ø
Courts can properly refer to the history of the
social movements.
Ø
Enquire into the social needs, object &
purposes which were agitating the society at the time of legislation &
which the statute had in view.
The Miscellaneous interpretation.
There are
various kinds of miscellaneous interpretations. Viz,
Ø
The legislative intent is to be gathered by
reading the statute as a whole. (1980. 4 S.C.C. 136)
Ø
Courts must interpret words & their meanings
so that public good is promoted & misuse of power is interdicted. (1981. 1
S.S.C. 314)
Ø
(a) The
dictionary meaning of a term may be resorted to when the definition clauses not
conceptually defined the expression. (1979 2
S.C.C. 354)
(b) However a resort to the dictionary meaning is
not necessary when the meaning of a word can be gathered from the context &
from the relevant regulations. (1979 2 S.C.C. 339)
Ø
Provisions of the fundamental rights of the
constitution must be liberally & widely construed. (1981.1. S.C.C. 608)
Ø
There is a presumption in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute. (1980 4 S.C.C. 697)
Ø
The constitution should not be interpreted with
a doctrine approach. (1981 1 S.C.C. 166).
Plain Meaning rule:
According to the
plain meaning rule, words must be given their plain, ordinary and literal
meaning. If the words are clear, they must be applied, even though the
intention of the legislator may have been different or the result is harsh or
undesirable.
Some laws are
meant for all citizens (e.g., criminal statutes) and some are meant only for
specialists (e.g., some sections of the tax code). A text that means one thing
in a legal context, might mean something else if it were in a technical manual
or a novel. So the plain meaning of a legal text is something like the meaning
that would be understood by competent speakers of the natural language in which
the text was written who are within the intended readership of the text and who
understand that the text is a legal text of a certain type.
Soft Plain Meaning Rule
Justices normally impose an absurdity limit on this rule, which states that a statute cannot be interpreted literally if it would lead to an absurd result. However, see '' Chung Fook V. White '', 264 U.S. 443 (1924).
This is
sometimes termed the soft plain meaning rule,
where the statute is interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of the
language, unless the result would be cruel or absurd. For example, see '' Rector, Holy Trinity Church V. United
States '', 143 U.S. 457 (1892). Even the most vocal supporters
of Textualism and the plain
meaning rule have been willing to commute "strict" plain meaning to
"soft" plain meaning to a certain extent, in some circumstances; see,
e.g. '' United States V. X-Citement Video
'', 513 U.S. 64
(1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting):
:"''I have been willing, in the case of civil statutes, to acknowledge a doctrine of "scrivener's error" that permits a court to give an unusual (though not unheard-of) meaning to a word which, if given its normal meaning, would produce an absurd and arguably unconstitutional result''."
Reasons
favored: Proponents of the plain meaning rule claim that it prevents courts
from taking sides in legislative or political issues. They also point out that
ordinary people and lawyers do not have extensive access to Secondary Sources
.
In Probate law the rule is also favored because the Testator is typically not around to indicate what interpretation of a Will is appropriate. Therefore, it is argued, extrinsic evidence should not be allowed to vary the words used by the testator or their meaning. It can help to provide for consistency in interpretation.
In Probate law the rule is also favored because the Testator is typically not around to indicate what interpretation of a Will is appropriate. Therefore, it is argued, extrinsic evidence should not be allowed to vary the words used by the testator or their meaning. It can help to provide for consistency in interpretation.
Criticism: This is the oldest of the Rules of Construction and is still used today, primarily because judges may not legislate. As there is always the danger that a particular interpretation may be the equivalent of making law, some judges prefer to adhere to the law's literal wording.
Opponents of the plain meaning rule claim that the rule rests on the erroneous assumption that words have a fixed meaning. In fact, words are imprecise, leading justices to impose their own prejudices to determine the meaning of a statute. However, since little else is offered as an alternative discretion-confining theory, plain meaning survives.
‘eiusdum generis’(of the same kind)
In addition to
the rules above, the courts also rely on rules of language to assist in
statutory interpretation. Firstly, eiusdum generis refers to words pertaining
to a particular category or class of things. In order for this form of
statutory interpretation to apply, the statute must specify at least two words
(Allen v Emerson (1944)). However, a judge must endeavour to limit the scope of
the terms to prevent a floodgate effect with the statute. Consideration must be
given for examples provided in the wording of the statute. Yet, phrases such
as, ‘other forms’ or ‘other places’, add obvious difficulties of statutory
interpretation, which may or may not favour the parties (see Powell v Kempton
Race Course (1884) and Evans v Cross (1938) respectively).
Noscitur a sociis (known from
associates)
A word will be
interpreted in the context of surrounding words. For example:
Muir v Keay (1875). All houses kept
open at night for “public refreshment, resort and entertainment” had to be
licensed. The defendant argued that his café did not need a licence
because he did not provide entertainment. The court held that “entertainment”
did not mean musical entertainment but the reception and accommodation of
people, so the defendant was guilty.
Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius (the express mention of one thing is the
exclusion of another)
The express
mention of things in a list excludes those things not mentioned. For
example:
Tempest v Kilner (1846). A statute
required that contracts for the sale of “goods, wares and merchandise” of £10
or more had to be evidenced in writing. The court had to decide if this
applied to a contract for the sale of stocks and shares. The court held
that the statute did not apply because stocks and shares were not mentioned.
Personal observations:
In Common Law jurisdictions,
the Judiciary may apply rules
of statutory interpretation to the primary legislation enacted by Parliament , or to the Delegated Legislation ,
which other bodies are authorized by parliament to make. Common law countries
also recognize Precedent as a source of
law. Rules of Construction may
be used to apply the provisions of legislation to a Legal Case.
.
In order for consistency in interpreting the meaning of legislation, courts use specific rules in order to resolve ambiguity appearing in statutes. Those rules are known collectively as rules of statutory interpretation. Different rules of interpretation may be applied and depend upon the nature of the ambiguity and the content in which it arises.
In order for consistency in interpreting the meaning of legislation, courts use specific rules in order to resolve ambiguity appearing in statutes. Those rules are known collectively as rules of statutory interpretation. Different rules of interpretation may be applied and depend upon the nature of the ambiguity and the content in which it arises.
So, In Bangladesh perspective
the statutory interpretation is a very necessary matter because, the statutes
are sometimes disables to provide proper remedy.
Conclusion:
Statutory interpretation refers to the process by which a court
looks at a statute and determines what it means. A statute, which is a bill or
law passed by the legislature, imposes obligations and rules
on the people. Statutes, however, although they make the law, may be open to interpretation and have ambiguities. Statutory interpretation
is the process of resolving those ambiguities and deciding how a particular
bill or law will apply in a particular case.
While
legislators strive for clarity and precision when drafting legislation, the
courts will often go to great lengths to determine the true meaning of a
statute. Statutory interpretation
is an exercise carried out by the courts, with the aid of rules and procedures
that are intended to decipher ambiguous and vague legislation. It is in the
interest of fairness and justice for a court to properly apply legislation to
case facts. Statutory interpretation is therefore an essential process, which
cannot be overlooked. It is easy to see why statutory interpretation might be
considered a skill of language, rather than law.
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